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Abstract
Many transactions are now computer mediated, making it possible for
sellers to condition their pricing on the history of interactions with
individual consumers. This paper investigates conditions under which
price conditioning will or will not be used. Our simplest model involves
rational consumers with constant valuations for the good being sold
and a monopoly seller who can commit to a pricing policy. In this
framework, the seller will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to condition pricing on
past behavior.
We consider various generalizations of this model, such as allowing
the seller to oﬀer enhanced services to previous customers, making the
seller unable to commit to a pricing policy, and allowing competition
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in the marketplace. All of these generalizations have equilibria with
price conditioning.1 INTRODUCTION 3
1 Introduction
In 1988 the cost of a gigabyte of hard disk storage was about $11,500. By
2000 that cost was $13, roughly 900 times cheaper. Today, a gigabyte of
storage costs about a dollar. This remarkable reduction of the cost of storing
information has led ﬁrms to capture, save, and analyze much more informa-
tion about transactions with their customers.
Supermarkets, airlines, credit cards and other industries have compiled
vast databases of individual consumer transactions. Sellers in these industries
routinely oﬀer price promotions, prizes, and other sorts of inducements to
individual customers based on their analyses of purchase behavior.
Collecting and analyzing such information is even easier in the online
world. Though the HTTP protocol used by Web servers is stateless, browsers
typically accept “cookies” from servers that contain information about the
current transaction. These cookies persist after the session has ended, so
that the next time the user accesses the server (using the same account) the
server can retrieve identiﬁcation which can be matched with details of past
interactions. See Schartz [2001] for a history of Web cookies and an overview
of how they work.
Even without cookies, static IP addresses, credit card numbers, direct user
authentication, and a variety of other mechanisms can be used to identify
individual users.
Since more and more transactions are mediated by computers, both online1 INTRODUCTION 4
and oﬄine, sellers can easily condition the price oﬀers that they make today
on past behavior. With computer mediated transactions, price discrimination
on an individual basis becomes quite feasible. See Bailey [1998], Economist
[2001] and Landesberg and Zeisser [2001] for discussion of how companies
can use tracking tools to reﬁne marketing strategies.
Of course, consumers can take defensive measures. No one is forced to
join a loyalty program, and it is easy to set one’s browser to reject cookies
or to erase them after a session is over. One can even use a variety of credit
cards or anonymous payment technologies to make purchases hard to trace.
In short, with today’s technology, sellers can post prices, observe choices,
and condition future prices on observed behavior. But buyers can also hide
the fact that they bought previously. Hence, it is likely that sellers will have
to oﬀer buyers some beneﬁts in order to induce them to reveal their identity.
In this paper, we develop some models of these strategic interactions
among buyers and sellers in which sellers can condition price on purchase
history. Our results are surprising. We ﬁnd that in the simplest model,
where consumers’ valuations of the good being sold are constant, sellers do
not want to condition current price oﬀers on past behavior. However, we
subsequently ﬁnd that if the consumer’s value for the good changes as he or
she makes more purchases, the seller will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to condition prices
on past behavior.
The seller can induce such a change in value by oﬀering enhanced services
to prior users, such as discount coupons (common in supermarket loyalty2 PREVIOUS LITERATURE 5
clubs), prizes or awards (common with airlines and credit cards), lowered
transactions costs (such as one-click shopping), or personalized services (such
as recommendations.)
2 Previous literature
Our analysis combines diﬀerent areas of research. It is of interest to the lit-
erature on inter-temporal price-discrimination, to the literature on behavior-
based targeted pricing, to the literature on the economic aspects of privacy,
and to the empirical literature on the value of purchase histories and cus-
tomer information.
With respect to the price-discrimination literature, we extend Mussa and
Rosen [1978], Stokey [1979], Riley and Zeckhauser [1983], and Salant [1989]’s
results on the conditions under which price discrimination is or is not optimal
for a seller who can commit to a pricing policy.
We also relate our results to the more recent literature on customer recog-
nition and targeted pricing (such as Hart and Tirole [1988], Villas-Boas
[1999], Villas-Boas [2001], Fudenberg and Tirole [1998], Fudenberg and Tirole
[2000], Chen and Zhang [2001], and Taylor [2002]). These papers generally
assume that the monopoly seller is unable to commit to a pricing policy.
We also contribute to the literature on the economic aspects of consumer
privacy (e.g., Posner [1981], Calzolari and Pavan [2001]) by examining not
only when sellers will want to condition prices, but also what the impact of3 THE MODEL 6
such conditioning will be.
We analyze both the cases of a monopolistic seller and competitive sellers,
with and without commitment, and we focus on understanding the advan-
tages and disadvantages that customers can gain from revealing personal
information to sellers. Our model reinforces the empirical literature on mar-
keting and customer information, such as Rossi and Allenby [1996] and Rossi
and Allenby [1999].
3 The model
We begin with a simple model of a single proﬁt-maximizing seller of a good
that can be provided at zero marginal cost.
The seller has a mechanism for recording purchase history of customers.
This could be based on technologies such as loyalty programs, credit card
numbers, static Internet addresses, or other such devices, but we will refer
to it as a “cookie.”
New customers come to the seller and are oﬀered a price. Their decision
about whether to purchase at this price is observed. The second time they
come to the seller the price they are oﬀered can be conditioned on their earlier
behavior. The following list summarizes the possible actions the seller can
take depending on whether or not a cookie is present and what it indicates
about prior behavior.
No cookie. The seller oﬀers a price and records whether or not the customer3 THE MODEL 7
purchases. It sets a cookie indicating whether or not purchase took
place at the oﬀered price.
Cookie shows customer bought before at price oﬀered. The seller of-
fers a price which may depend on the details of the previous purchase.
Cookie shows customer did not buy before at price oﬀered. The seller
oﬀers a possibly diﬀerent price.
We approach this problem from the perspective of mechanism design.
For simplicity we restrict ourselves to two types and two periods. Let vH be
high-value type’s willingness to pay for one unit of consumption, and let vL
be the low-value type’s willingness to pay for one unit of consumption. Let
π indicate the fraction of the population that has the high value.
We will assume that if the consumer is indiﬀerent, he will act in the
manner preferred by the seller, since the seller could always cut a price by
a penny if it were proﬁtable to do so. For simplicity, we also assume a zero
discount rate.
If the seller sets a ﬂat price of vH each period, it will make a proﬁt of
2πvH and if it sets a ﬂat price of vL each period, it will make a proﬁt of 2vL.
The maximum proﬁt available from ﬂat pricing is therefore max{2πvH,2vL}.
We are interested in whether the seller can do better by some form of
conditioning that will allow price discrimination so that the high-value person
pays more than the low-value person.4 ALL CONSUMERS MYOPIC 8
4 All consumers myopic
Myopic consumers are those who base their purchase decision on the price
that they see today. They do not recognize that the price they face on the
next purchase may depend on today’s behavior.
In this case the seller can oﬀer a price of vH in the ﬁrst meeting with the
consumer. If the consumer does not purchase at this price, the seller can
oﬀer a price of vL the second time.
This strategy results in sales of 2 units to the high-value population and
1 unit to the low-value population, yielding revenues of
2πvH + (1 − π)vL.
How does price conditioning aﬀect overall welfare? There are two cases.
Case 1. πvH > vL. If conditioning were not possible, the seller would
sell only to the high-value consumers. Allowing conditioning doesn’t change
the price the high-value consumers face. Low-value consumers purchase the
good, but get zero surplus from the purchase. Hence overall welfare (producer
plus consumer surplus) rises, but this is entirely due to the increased proﬁt
received by the seller.
Case 2. πvH < vL. If conditioning were not possible, the seller would sell





















for which the seller would sell to everyone if it didn’t have a way to condition,
but chooses to restrict output when a conditioning technology is available.
The high-value consumers loose under conditioning, the low-value consumers
are no worse oﬀ (though they consume in one period rather than two.) The
seller is better oﬀ due to selling at a higher price to the high-value consumers
but worse oﬀ from losing one period of revenue from the low-value consumers.
If the seller voluntarily chooses to condition, it must be better oﬀ, but overall
welfare declines.
5 All consumers sophisticated
Consumer may eventually come to recognize that purchasing at a high price
is not the best strategy, since it guarantees that they will face a high price
in the future. Let us suppose now that consumers can delete cookies, use an
anonymous payment system, or take some other steps to avoid establishing
a purchase history.
Initially, we suppose that all consumers are sophisticated and see through5 ALL CONSUMERS SOPHISTICATED 10
the seller’s strategy.
Let pH be the present value (in this case, the sum) of the prices charged to
the high-value person, and pL the present value of the prices charged to the
low-value person. Let xH be the total amount consumed by the high-value
type and xL the total amount consumed by the low-value type.
The optimization problem facing the seller is:
max
xH,xL,pH,pL
πpH + (1 − π)pL (1)
vHxH − pH ≥ vHxL − pL (2)
vHxH − pH ≥ 0 (3)
vLxL − pL ≥ vLxH − pH (4)
vLxL − pL ≥ 0. (5)
It is clear that due to the linearity of the problem xL and xH can only
take on the values {0,1,2}. Table 1 lists the maximum revenue associated
with the eight possible cases.
Note that the last three cases dominate the others, so that there are
relatively few interesting cases. We will examine two of the cases in the table
to get a ﬂavor for the analysis.
Consider case (xH,xL) = (1,2). Among the self-selection constraints are
vH − pH ≥ 2vH − pL (6)
2vL − pL ≥ vL − pH. (7)5 ALL CONSUMERS SOPHISTICATED 11
xH xL Maximum revenue
0 0 0
0 1 Not incentive compatible
0 2 Not incentive compatible
1 0 πvH
1 1 vL
1 2 Not incentive compatible
2 0 2πvH
2 1 πvH + vL
2 2 2vL
Table 1: Payoﬀs and proﬁts.
Rearranging these inequalities gives us the contradiction
vL ≥ pL − pH ≥ vH. (8)
Now consider case (xH,xL) = (2,1). The self-selection constraints are
2vH − pH ≥ vH − pL (9)
2vH − pH ≥ 0 (10)
vL − pL ≥ 2vL − pH (11)
vL − pL ≥ 0. (12)
It is easily seen that the solution to these inequalities is pL = vL and pH =
vH +vL, which yields a proﬁt of πvH +vL. When does this exceed the proﬁt5 ALL CONSUMERS SOPHISTICATED 12
from ﬂat pricing? That is, when do we have
πvH + vL > max{2πvH,2vL}? (13)
The following result shows the answer is “never.”
Fact 1 (Conditioning is not optimal.) It is never optimal for the seller
to condition prices on past behavior when consumers are sophisticated.
Proof. Writing out the necessary inequalities in 13 we have
πvH + vL > 2πvH (14)
πvH + vL > 2vL. (15)
Adding these together gives a contradiction. 2
The result that price discrimination is not optimal in this context is closely
related to Stokey [1979] and Salant [1989]. Stokey [1979] shows that in-
tertemporal price discrimination (with commitment to the posted prices) is
never optimal. Salant [1989] extends Stokey’s result to the case of multiple
types and shows that it follows from the linearity of the constraints in the
problem.1 He also relates Stokey’s problem to the Mussa and Rosen [1978]
quality-discrimination results.
1Riley and Zeckhauser [1983]’s “no haggling” result is also related to linearity and is
related to the Stokey-Salant results, as well as the analysis of this paper.6 A GEOMETRIC TREATMENT 13
In our model, we allow the seller to identify individual buyers and con-
dition pricing on purchase history of individual consumers, a feature not
considered in the Stokey-Salant models. However, we ﬁnd that with sophis-
ticated consumers, our model has the same “reduced form” as the Stokey
model. This is basically a consequence of the revelation principle: both the
Stokey-Salant model and the model we examine are equivalent to the same
mechanism design problem.
6 A geometric treatment
The most interesting case of price conditioning in the previous section was
case (2,1), in which the high-value type consumed both periods and the low-
value type consumed only in the second period.
The self-selection constraints for this case are given in inequalities 9-12,
which can be written as
vH + pL ≥ pH (16)
2vH ≥ pH (17)
pH ≥ vL + pL (18)
vL ≥ pL. (19)
We have plotted these inequalities in Figure 1. It is clear by inspection
that (pH,pL) = (vH + vL,vL) is the only candidate for proﬁt-maximization;6 A GEOMETRIC TREATMENT 14
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Figure 1: Self-selection constraints.
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Figure 2: Demand curves, with shaded area indicating revenue.
this is the point illustrated by the black dot.
But does this solution dominate ﬂat pricing? Refer to Figure 2 where
we have plotted the demand curve for total consumption for two groups of
consumers. The shaded part of the curve equals the revenue extracted by the
seller under these prices. It is easy to see that if A > B, charging only vH
yields more revenue, and if B > A charging the vL yields more revenue. Hence
one of these two ﬂat pricing strategies must dominate diﬀerential pricing.
Intuitively, if selling to the high-value customers is more proﬁtable than6 A GEOMETRIC TREATMENT 15
selling to both high- and low-value customers, then the seller wants to always
sell to those customers. There is no advantage to cutting its price to sell to
the low-value customers.
This result is somewhat disconcerting since sellers have invested many
millions of dollars in computer systems to allow them to collect customer
history to enable them to condition pricing on purchase behavior. Though
experimentation with such systems has only gone on for a few years in the
online world, loyalty programs for airlines travelers and supermarket shoppers
have been around for years. Such programs commonly oﬀer special prices to
consumers with diﬀerent purchase histories. But the results described above
show that, at least in the simplest model, such behavior is not proﬁtable.
What is missing from this model?
One answer is that it that not all of the population is sophisticated. We
examine this in the next section.
Another answer is customer resistance. However, frequent ﬂyer programs
and supermarket loyalty cards have been extremely popular. No one likes
to think that they have been charged more than anyone else, but everyone
likes to get a price break. Structuring a personalized pricing program in a
palatable way is important, but the airline and supermarket examples show
that it can be done.
Another approach is suggested by inspection of Figure 2. The geometric
argument for no conditioning depended heavily on the fact that the value
of the ﬁrst purchase was the same as the value of the second purchase. It6 A GEOMETRIC TREATMENT 16
appears likely that price discrimination could be optimal when the value of
the second unit of consumption has a diﬀerent value than the ﬁrst.
We could, for example, assume that marginal utility of consumption is
decreasing so that the value of the second unit of consumption is less than
that of the ﬁrst. This is equivalent to the standard analysis of quality or
quantity discrimination, in which utility is assumed to be a concave function
of quality/quantity. See Mussa and Rosen [1978] and Maskin and Riley [1984]
for early treatments and Tirole [1988] and Varian [1992] for textbook analysis.
Salant [1989] establishes conditions for price discrimination to dominate ﬂat
pricing in his related model.
A more interesting assumption, in our context, is to examine the case
where the second unit of consumption is more valuable than the ﬁrst. This
could arise because the second visit to the merchant is more eﬃcient or pleas-
ant than the ﬁrst one, which might occur because the seller oﬀered enhanced
services of some form, which could be enabled by the information the cus-
tomer has revealed during the ﬁrst purchase. Examples could be targeted
recommendations, personalized service or content, one-click shopping, prizes,
or a variety of other enhanced services. This case has not been examined in
the previous literature, but is relatively easy to handle in our discrete frame-
work.7 SOME CONSUMERS ARE MYOPIC 17
7 Some consumers are myopic
Suppose that a fraction m of each type is myopic, with a fraction 1−m being
sophisticated. This case is undoubtedly realistic, but relatively straightfor-
ward in terms of analysis, so we will conduct only a cursory examination.
Assume that the seller conditions prices on purchase history by ﬁrst charg-
ing a high price to everyone and then oﬀering a low price to those who did
not purchase.
The low-value consumers and the sophisticated high-value customers will
wait for second period to buy at the low price. The myopic high-value con-
sumers pay the high price each period. The revenue the seller receives is
therefore
2mπvH + (1 − mπ)vL.










Hence if the fraction of myopic consumers is large enough, the seller will want
to condition prices on purchase history.
Of course, the myopic consumers could just be consumers who had a par-
ticularly high cost of deleting cookies, or engaging in other sorts of anonymiz-
ing behavior.
Note that, as usual, the presence of unsophisticated consumers can ex-8 ENHANCED SERVICES 18
High type Low type Maximum revenue
vH1 + vH2 vL1 + vL2 vL1 + vL2
vH1 + vH2 vL1 vL1 + πvL2
vH1 + vH2 0 π(vH1 + vH2)
vH1 vL1 + vL2 Not incentive compatible
vH1 vL1 vL1
vH1 0 πvH1
0 vL1 + vL2 Not incentive compatible
0 vL1 Not incentive compatible
Table 2: Payoﬀs and proﬁts for multiple consumption case.
ert a negative externality on the sophisticated consumers, by creating an
equilibrium that makes the sophisticated consumers worse oﬀ.
8 Enhanced services
Let vH1 represents the value of the ﬁrst unit of consumption for the high-
value consumer, and vH2 the value of the second unit of consumption. Deﬁne
vL1 and vL2 similarly. Of course, we assume that
vH1 > vL1 (20)
Utility for the high-value consumer can take on 3 values, (0,vH1,vH1 +
vH2) and likewise for the low-value consumer. Note that it is, by deﬁnition,
impossible to receive a utility of vH2. Thus there are 23 cases, which are
summarized in Table 2.
The only interesting case is where the high-value type consumes twice8 ENHANCED SERVICES 19
and the low-value type consumes once, so we spell that one out.
The self-selection constraints for the conditioning solution in this case are
vH1 + vH2 − pH ≥ vH1 − pL (21)
vH1 + vH2 − pH ≥ 0 (22)
vL1 − pL ≥ vL1 + vL2 − pH (23)
vL1 − pL ≥ 0, (24)
which can be transformed to
vH2 + pL ≥ pH (25)
vH1 + vH2 ≥ pH (26)
pH ≥ vL2 + pL (27)
vL1 ≥ pL. (28)
These inequalities are plotted in Figure 3. The optimum is determined by
pH = vH2 + vL1 and pL = vL1. We need to verify that the horizontal line
determined by pH = vH1 + vH2 passes above this optimum. Algebraically,
this requires:
vH1 + vH2 > vH2 + vL1, (29)
Making the cancellation we see that this condition reduces to assumption
(20).8 ENHANCED SERVICES 20
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Figure 3: Self-selection constraints.
The revenue from price conditioning exceeds the revenue from ﬂat pricing
when
πvH2 + vL1 > πvH1 + πvH2 (30)
πvH2 + vL1 > vL1 + vL2. (31)
Making the obvious cancellations gives us the following result.




in which case pH = vH2 + vL1 and pL = vL1.8 ENHANCED SERVICES 21
Note that the second inequality is more likely to hold when the seller
can oﬀer an enhanced service that is worth relatively more to the high-value
type than to the low-value type. For example, one-click shopping may be
more valuable to those who consume more frequently, or to those who have
a higher value of time. Similarly, personalized coupons for baby food might
be more valuable to consumers who have previously purchased diapers.
Indeed, if both types have the same value for the enhanced service, the
necessary inequalities cannot both be satisﬁed. To see this, assume the con-
trary:
vH2 − vH1 = vL2 − vL1 = e > 0. (32)
Now subtract the second inequality from the ﬁrst in Fact 2, to ﬁnd
π(vH2 − vH1) > vL2 − vL1. (33)
Substituting, and recalling that π < 1, we have the contradiction
πe > e. (34)
It is also worth noting that we have never needed to assume that vH2 >
vH1 or vL2 > vH1. Hence Fact 2 applies in the classic case of “diminishing
marginal utility” just as well as it does in the “enhanced service” case in our
application.9 TIMING 22
9 Timing
We have seen that the seller will condition prices on purchase history when
it is able to provide an enhanced service that has diﬀerential value to the
consumers. We have seen that the present value of the payments will be
pH = vH2 + vL1 (35)
pL = vL1. (36)
Since we are assuming that the seller can commit to price plans, it appears
that this present value can be divided between the two periods in a variety
of ways. However, whether or not that is the case depends on the tools that
the high-value buyer has to defend himself against the price discrimination.
Let us return to the setup in the introduction and consider an overlapping
generations model where consumers visit an online store at most twice. If
they have no cookie indicating a prior visit, they are charged p0. If they have
a cookie indicating that they bought on a prior visit, they are charged pb.
If they have a cookie indicating that they did not buy on their earlier visit,
they are charged pn.
One way to implement the pricing system described in equations (35-36)
is to charge
p0 = vH1 (37)
pb = vL1 + vH2 − vH1 (38)9 TIMING 23
pn = vL1. (39)
In the second visit the high type pays vL1 plus a premium equal to the
incremental value of the enhanced service. This strategy is commonly im-
plemented by special oﬀers to “new customers only,” with repeat customers
paying the “standard” price.
But another way to implement the same present value is to charge
p0 = vL1 (40)
pb = vH2 (41)
pn = vL1. (42)
Here everyone is charged a low price on ﬁrst visit and a high price on the
second visit. Essentially, the seller is collecting information on the ﬁrst visit
which is then used to provide the enhanced service that only the high-value
people are willing to pay for on the second visit. For example, an online mer-
chant learns billing information and shipping address on the ﬁrst visit. On
the second visit, the merchant can oﬀer, for example, “one-click shopping,”
a service that frequent purchasers, or those with high time value, might ﬁnd
particularly valuable.2
Which of these two pricing patterns might we expect? The answer de-
2Below we describe some empirical results from Goolsbee and Chevalier [2002] that
show that Amazon customers are much less price sensitive that Barnes and Nobel cus-
tomers, possibly because of the enhanced services that Amazon oﬀers.10 WELFARE EFFECT OF CONDITIONING 24
pends on the nature of the technology at the buyer’s disposal. If the only
way that the high-value consumer can imitate the low-value consumer is to
delay purchase when faced with a high-price during the ﬁrst visit to a store,
then these two price proﬁles are equivalent.
But if the high-value consumer can delete his cookies, and return to the
seller appearing to be a consumer who never bought before, the proﬁle that
involves charging p0 = vL1 cannot be an equilibrium. For if this proﬁle were
oﬀered, the high-value consumer would buy on its ﬁrst visit (taking the “low
introductory oﬀer for new consumers”), delete his cookie, and then return to
buy again at the same price. True, he would not get the enhanced service,
but his payoﬀ would be 2vH1−2vL1, which is larger than vH1−vL1, the payoﬀ
from pricing plan (35-36).
Hence the only equilibrium price plan when “delete cookies” (or, more
generally, anonymous shopping) is possible is to charge the high price ﬁrst.
10 Welfare eﬀect of conditioning
How does price conditioning aﬀect social welfare? The appropriate surplus
calculations are shown in Table 3. Note that in terms of total welfare, condi-
tioning ﬁts between the two other cases. Conditioning dominates ﬂat pricing
when the alternative is selling only to the high-value type, but not when the
alternative is selling to both types.
More speciﬁcally, if vL1+vL2 < π(vH1+vH2), and the inequalities in Fact11 NO COMMITMENT 25
Case Consumer Producer Total
Surplus Surplus Surplus
Sell only to high-value 0 π[vH1 + vH2] π[vH1 + vH2]
Condition prices π[vH1 − vL1] πvH2 + vL1 π[vH1 + vH2] + (1 − π)vL1
Sell to both π[vH1 + vH2 − vL1 − vL2] vL2 + vL1 π[vH1 + vH2] + (1 − π)[vL1 + vL2]
Table 3: Surplus calculations.
2 are satisﬁed, allowing ﬁrms to use cookies makes the society as a whole
better oﬀ. The welfare ordering of the outcomes is the same as the ordering
of total quantity sold, which is consistent with the welfare analysis in Varian
[1985].
11 No commitment
What happens when the seller cannot commit to its second period behavior?
Let us return to the baseline model described in Section 1. If the most
proﬁtable strategy is to sell at the low price, the inability to commit doesn’t
aﬀect the outcome.
However, when the most proﬁtable strategy is to charge the high price to
all, the inability to commit leave the door open to the high type to emulate
the strategy of the low-value type, hoping that the seller will then cut the
price in the second period.
Since this case is analyzed in Fudenberg and Tirole [1991], pp. 402-405,
and in Taylor [2002], we only present the intuition of the argument.
Suppose the high-value type accepts any ﬁrst-visit price less than vH with
probability 1. Then if the seller observes a rejection, it must be a low-value11 NO COMMITMENT 26
type. This means that the seller will oﬀer a low value on second visit. But
then high-value type wouldn’t want to always accept with probability 1 since
rejecting would get him a lower price. A similar argument shows that the
high-value type won’t reject a price less than vH with probability 1.
It follows that the high-value type will pursue a mixed strategy in equilib-
rium. In equilibrium, the seller will charge the same prices as in the case with
full commitment, but will make less proﬁt due to the randomized strategy of
the high-value type.3
Turning now to the case of enhanced services, we ask: “Can price condi-
tioning be an equilibrium when sellers cannot commit to future pricing?” The
answer is “yes,” but there is a subtlety. When commitment is not possible,
we have to worry about the sequencing of price oﬀers.
Any ﬁrst period price in which the high-value and low-value types behave
diﬀerently will allow the seller to enforce a separating equilibrium second
period. Hence the equilibrium in which the seller conditions must be inter-
preted as one in which the seller oﬀers to the same price to everyone ﬁrst
period, vL1 and oﬀers a price of vH2 second period.
However, we saw in section 9 that oﬀering the low price ﬁrst period is an
equilibrium only when the high-value buyer cannot delete cookies; that is,
the only way the high-value consumer has to imitate the low-value consumer
3Because proﬁt is reduced due to randomization, there may be conditioning solutions
that yield more proﬁt than the ﬂat price outcome when the discount rate is greater than
one. We are greatful to Curtis Taylor for pointing this out to us, as well as explaining
some of the intricacies of the no-committment problem.11 NO COMMITMENT 27
is to delay purchase.
In practice, this is a case in which a seller is able to oﬀer a coupon to new
users only, in the hope of converting them into second-period customers.
Of course, if anyone can pretend to be a new customer, this strategy is
not eﬀective in enforcing price discrimination. (We examine a competitive
equilibrium of this sort in a later section.). If the high-value consumer can
“delete” rather than just “delay,” being unable to commit imposes a cost
on the seller, in that it will not be able to implement a price conditioning
solution.
In addition, if the value of the enhanced service is such that price dis-
crimination is not optimal, and ﬂat-pricing at the high price is better than
ﬂat pricing at the low price, the lack of a commitment device might force
the seller to adopt a mixed strategy in the ﬁrst period just as in the baseline
case.
One way for the seller to commit to ﬂat pricing is to publicly post prices.
This is common in both supermarkets and online shopping, where most price
discounting takes place via coupons of one sort or another.
This analysis thus far depends the fact that the model terminates after
two periods. It would be desirable to examine a no-commitment model with
several periods, but such an extension brings up several additional issues.
See Villas-Boas [1999], Villas-Boas [2001], Fudenberg and Tirole [1998] and
Fudenberg and Tirole [2000] for models of this type.12 COMPETITION AND CONDITIONING 28
12 Competition and conditioning
Up until now we have been considering a monopoly seller. In this section
we examine what happens when identical sellers compete for customers. We
assume that these sellers cannot commit to future prices, and cannot tell
whether customers have bought before from other ﬁrms.
As before, we assume each seller sets prices of p0 if the customer has no
cookie, pb if a cookie shows customer bought at p0, and pn if the cookie shows
that the consumer did not buy at p0.
We also assume that the good can be provided at constant marginal cost
of c ≥ 0. To avoid trivial cases we also assume vH1 > c. Since we normalize
the population size to 1, the cost of selling one unit to a fraction π of the
population is πc. We also assume that the enhanced service can be provided
at zero marginal cost; this makes no diﬀerence as long as the consumers’
valuations of the enhanced service exceed its marginal cost.
There are several conceivable equilibria. Consumers could make their
ﬁrst purchase from a ﬁrm and then stay with it in order to receive enhanced
services on the next purchase. Some consumers could switch to a competitor
or delete their cookies in order to receive the “introductory” price of p0. Or,
possibly, everyone could switch sellers every period.
We use the notation introduced earlier for the incremental value of the
enhanced service:
eH = vH2 − vH112 COMPETITION AND CONDITIONING 29
eL = vL2 − vL1.
We will spell out the analysis for the case where the Spence-Mirrlees
condition holds,
eL < eH,
and simply state the results for the reverse inequality, since the analysis is
completely parallel.
There are three equilibrium conditions that must be satisﬁed:
1. Consumers must be make optimal choices, which will impose a set of
inequalities.
2. Proﬁts are driven to zero, which is an equality.
3. Firms are proﬁt maximizing, which requires comparing their price choices
to alternative choices they might make.
Case 1. We ﬁrst show that it is not an equilibrium for all ﬁrms to charge
a ﬂat price p at which all consumers purchase. The zero proﬁt condition
requires p = c. Consider a single ﬁrm that raises its price by any amount
less than min{eH,eL} and provides the (free) enhanced service. This will
be an attractive option for some or all consumers, thereby increasing proﬁt,
showing that charging ﬂat prices is not an equilibrium.
Case 2. All customers shop at the same store twice rather than switch.12 COMPETITION AND CONDITIONING 30
Consumer optimization requires
vH2 − pb ≥ vH1 − p0 (43)
vL2 − pb ≥ vL1 − p0, (44)
or
pb ≤ p0 + eH (45)
pb ≤ p0 + eL. (46)
Proﬁt maximization will drive pb to satisfy
pb = p0 + eL,
and competition ensures proﬁts are driven to zero, which means
p0 + pb = 2c.
Solving these two equations in two unknowns we have








In order to show that this is an equilibrium, we need to show that no single12 COMPETITION AND CONDITIONING 31
ﬁrm can increase its proﬁt by changing its behavior.
Clearly no ﬁrm will want to lower its price. Will a single ﬁrm want to
raise its price? By raising pb to p0 + eH the deviating ﬁrm will induce its
low-value customers to switch to the competition, or delete their cookies, in
order to purchase at price p0. On the other hand the high-value customers
will choose to pay the higher price. The proﬁt from this pricing deviation
will be less than the proﬁt from the presumed equilibrium when
p0 + π(p0 + eH) + (1 − π)p0 < p0 + pb = 2p0 + eL,
which reduces to
πeH < eL.
Note that this is a “lock-in” equilibrium: consumers face a cost of switching
second period, because they would lose the enhanced service. Firms respond
by charging low prices ﬁrst period, then high prices second period, as de-
scribed in Klemperer [1989, 1995].
Case 3. The low-value type switches to another seller or deletes its cookie,
the high-value type remains.
This requires
pb ≤ p0 + eH (49)
pb ≥ p0 + eL. (50)
(51)12 COMPETITION AND CONDITIONING 32
Proﬁt maximization now implies pb = p0 + eH. Proﬁts come from everyone
buying at p0 during the ﬁrst visit, and high-value types buying at pb and
low-value types buying at p0 during their second visit. Competition ensures
that proﬁts are driven to zero, implying
p0 + π(p0 + eH) + (1 − π)p0 = 2c,
or
2p0 + πeH = 2c.
Solving for equilibrium we have









For this to be an equilibrium no single ﬁrm can deviate from these prices
and make a proﬁt. If a single ﬁrm lowers pb to p0 + eL, it will keep its low-
value customers but make less revenue on the high-value customers. This
will not be proﬁtable when
p0 + pb = p0 + (p0 + eL) < p0 + (p0 + πeH),12 COMPETITION AND CONDITIONING 33
which is to say when
eL < πeH.
This is a “partial lock-in” equilibrium, as only the low-value types ﬁnd it
attractive to switch. The ﬁrms ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to let them go than
to keep them, since keeping them would require cutting the price to the
high-value types.
Case 4. The high-value type switches sellers, and the low-value type re-
mains. This requires
pb ≥ p0 + eH (55)
pb ≤ p0 + eL, (56)
(57)
which implies
p0 + eL ≥ pb ≥ p0 + eH
Hence this case cannot occur when eH > eL.
Here is a summary of the results.
Fact 3 (Equilibria with competition.) With identical competing ﬁrms we
have
• It is never an equilibrium for all ﬁrms to charge a ﬂat price.
• If eL < eH, then in equilibrium12 COMPETITION AND CONDITIONING 34
– No consumers will switch when eL > πeH.
– Low-value consumers will switch when eL < πeH.
– High-value consumers will never switch.
• If eL > eH, then in equilibrium
– No consumers will switch when eH > (1 − π)eL.
– High-value consumers will switch when eH < (1 − π)eL.
– Low-value consumers will never switch.
These outcomes exhibit a form of “customer poaching,” a term introduced
by Fudenberg and Tirole [2000]. They analyze a duopoly in which some
consumers remain loyal and others defect to the competitor. In their model
switching costs are zero, ﬁrms oﬀer partial substitutes a la Hotelling, services
are not personalized, and ﬁrms can tell which ﬁrms consumers bought from
previously. Their baseline case is long distance telecommunications service,
which is quite diﬀerent from our situation, due to the undiﬀerentiated nature
of the good being sold.
In our situation, the seller can able to provide a personalized service that
is valuable to at least some of the consumers. This creates switching costs for
the consumers, since they would then have to rebuild the relationship with
the seller.
In some cases these switching costs may be relatively small—e.g., enter-
ing credit card information—but even relatively small switching costs can13 SUMMARY 35
matter. Goolsbee and Chevalier [2002] estimate demand elasticities facing
Amazon and barnesandnoble.com. They ﬁnd that the demand curve fac-
ing Amazon is much more inelastic than that facing barnesandnoble.com,
an eﬀect that may be due to the more personalized environment oﬀered by
Amazon. If this hypothesis is correct, it may be that Amazon’s investment
in “enhanced services” may be a signiﬁcant contribution to its competitive
advantage. Note that oﬀering such services required large expenditures in
ﬁxed cost to implement the system, but have very small marginal costs to
service each customer.
13 Summary
In this paper we have investigated the conditions under which price con-
ditioning will be optimal for a seller when the history of interactions with
individual consumers can be tracked.
In our baseline case, with constant values for the product being sold, the
seller will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to condition prices on past customer behavior.
If enough customers are myopic, or the costs of using anonymous technologies
are too high, the seller will want to condition pricing on purchase history.
If the seller can oﬀer enhanced services to returning customers due to the
information it has received from them during previous transactions, it will
also often be proﬁtable to condition.
We have extended this analysis to consider scenarios where the sellerREFERENCES 36
cannot commit to prices and where the seller faces competition. In these
cases there may be mixed strategy equilibria and lock-in equilibria.
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